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Abstract: The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a 
radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological 
positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the 
value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be 
defensible. 
 
1   Introduction 
 
Our knowledge about the external world is often grounded in perceptual experience.1 What we take ourselves to 
know about the external world has often been used to motivate particular claims about the nature of perception 
and perceptual experience. Philosophers working in the epistemology of perception might be familiar with the 
following type of argument, from intuitions about what we know to conclusions about the nature of perceptual 
experience: 
 
P1 Perceptual experience justifies belief that p. 
P2 If P1 is true, then perceptual experience must have property Φ. 
P3 Theory T rules out property Φ. 
C Theory T should be amended or rejected. 
 
A rough version of the above has been used to argue against sense data theory: 
 
SD1 Perceptual experience justifies belief about the external world. 
SD2 If SD1 is true, then we have perceptual contact with the external world. 
SD3 Sense data theory rejects perceptual contact with the external world. 
C Sense data theory should be amended or rejected. 
 
I am interested in a variant of this kind of argument: these are arguments from theories of how we know to 
conclusions about the nature of perceptual experience: 
 
P1* Theory of knowledge K says that knowing that p requires ψ. 
P2* Theory of experience E rules out (or fails to explain) ψ. 
P3* Intuitively, we can know that p. 
C Theory K rules out theory E. 
 
In this paper I will examine and defend a version of this kind of argument (one that goes from a theory of 
knowledge to a theory of experience), which comes from the Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology. 
 
The Nyāya were an orthodox Hindu school of classical Indian philosophy. In contrast to heterodox Buddhist 
traditions, Nyāya defended a commonsense metaphysical realism based on intuitions about the acquisition of 
knowledge. The school’s foundational text is the Nyāya-Sūtra – a five volume text that lays out the groundwork 
for a theory of the conditions under which knowledge, which is treated as a kind of ‘successful cognition’, might 
be obtained reliably.2 Perhaps one of the most enduring contributions of the Nyāya school is the theory (vāda) 
of knowledge sources (pramāṇa).3 
 
Nyāya divides the obtaining of knowledge into four irreducible categories (perception, inference, comparison, 
and testimony), and holds that perceptual experience – or pratyakṣa – is the primary source of our knowledge. 
Nyāya holds that perception is a kind of veridical cognition:4 
 
Perception is the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact (and which is) ‘not due to 
words’ (avyapadeśya), ‘invariably related’ [to the object] (avyabhicāri) and is ‘of a definite 
character’ (vyavasāyātmaka) (NS; i.1.4) (Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya, Nyāya: 
Gautama’s Nyāya-Sutra with Vātsyāyana’s Commentary, p. 43). 
 
The Naiyāyikas (Nyāya scholars) were motivated by their treatment of knowledge to accept a disjunctivist theory 
of perceptual experience, on which veridical and illusory perception are treated as fundamentally different 
phenomena. Nyāya holds that illusory experience is grounded in impressions from previous experiences left on 
the mind. Consider this passage from Phaṇibūṣaṇa’s fourteenth century elucidation of the Nyāya-Sūtra: 
 The Naiyāyikas hold that when the visual sense comes into contact with the flickering rays of 
the sun, because of the perception of the similarity therein of water previously perceived 
elsewhere, there is the revival of the reminiscent impression (saṃskāra) of the previously 
perceived water, which in turn recalls the water and thus in the rays is erroneously perceived 
the water belonging to a different space and time (ND) (Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya, 
Nyāya: Gautama’s Nyāya-Sutra with Vātsyāyana’s Commentary, p. 53). 
 
In contemporary parlance, the Naiyāyikas were proponents of an externalist theory of knowledge, defending a 
view on which knowledge is treated as an occurrent mental event caused by the obtaining of a perceptual relation 
– pratyakṣa – between agent and object. Nyāya also argued for a disjunctivist, naïve realist theory of perception. 
Interestingly, some of the Nyāya arguments for naïve realism seem to be arguments from their particular version 
of epistemic externalism. This is significant because this connection – between theories of knowledge and 
theories of experience – is underexplored in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
 
In Section 2, I give a brief overview of the externalist theory of epistemology defended by Nyāya (as well as 
some contemporary relatives) and theories of perceptual experience. I then proceed to the argument from 
externalism to disjunctivism: in Section 3, I reconstruct what I take to be the Nyāya argument for the school’s 
particular theory of perceptual experience. I note that this argument is only an argument for a weak sort of 
epistemic disjunctivism. In Section 4, I consider ways of making the argument stronger. 
 
2   Background: Epistemology and Perception 
 
I now turn to a brief overview of epistemological externalism (2.1) and also of theories of perceptual experience 
(2.2). Because these topics are both so broad, I will be limiting my discussion to the version of externalism 
defended by Nyāya, as well as its contemporary correlates: these are externalist theories of knowledge that treat 
knowledge as an occurrent mental event (e.g., Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits). However, I take much of 
what is said in this paper to be applicable to other versions of externalism. Likewise, in my discussion of theories 
of experience I will focus on the two most popular relational theories of experience: common factor 
intentionalism and naïve realism. 
 
2.1   Externalist Epistemologies 
 
Contemporary analytic epistemology can be divided into roughly two camps, one internalist and the other 
externalist. Internalist theories take the source of justification to be internal states, and typically hold that there 
is some sort of ‘luminosity’ condition on knowledge (a condition which states that if you know that p then you 
know that you know that p).5 Externalist theories take the source of justification to be external, and allow that 
knowledge is not luminous. 
 
The most widely held externalist view in epistemology is reliabilism (Goldman 1979). This is the theory that 
your belief that p counts as knowledge that p if it was produced by a reliable source. Beliefs that I come to have 
on the basis of perceptual experience (might) count as knowledge because perception is a reliable source of 
knowledge. 
 
An analysis of knowledge cut to the same externalist cloth is defended by the Nyāya school.6 Nyāya defended a 
theory of knowledge based on immediate cognitive contact (jnana) between agents and objects, treating 
knowledge as an occurrent mental process, rather than a dispositional mental state. Nyāya treats knowledge not 
in terms of externally justified belief, but as a specific kind of cognition or mental event due to a ‘reliable source’ 
(pramāṇa): 
 
Successful activity (samartha-pravṛtti) results when the object (artha) is cognized by the 
‘instrument of valid knowledge’ (pramāṇa). Hence the instrument of valid knowledge is 
invariably connected with the object (arthavat). There is no cognition (pratipatti) of object 
(artha) without the instrument of valid knowledge… (NB) (Chattopadhyaya and 
Gangopadhyaya, Nyāya: Gautama’s Nyāya-Sutra with Vātsyāyana’s Commentary, p. 3). 
 
Knowledge is a relation between agent (pramātā) and object.7 That relation is mediated by pramāṇa: the 
knowledge source. This is a short-lived, immediate cognitive relation. As Phillips and Tatacharya note in the 
introductory remarks to their translation of Gaṅgeśa’s Tattva-cintā-maṇi: 
 
Ontologically, a cognition is a short-lived, episodic quality of an individual self. Strictly 
speaking, a cognition is a mental event and a short-lived state rather than an act... Unlike 
western epistemology, Nyāya focuses not on beliefs but on cognitions that are identified by 
their objects or “objecthood” (visayatā)… (Phillips and Tatacharya, Epistemology of 
Perception, p. 13). 
 
This notion of a reliable source differs from contemporary notions of reliability (as well as from the colloquial 
use of the term): for Nyāya, a knowledge source must be completely reliable and never produce ‘false’ cognition. 
To say that knowledge is the ‘result’ of a reliable process (like sense-object contact) is not strong enough. 
Knowledge is the relation between knower and object that the ‘reliable source’ (i.e., perception) mediates. As 
Vātsyāyana states, “in all cases of perception the knower has the definite knowledge of an object through the 
sense” (NB) (Nyāya: Gautama’s Nyāya-Sutra with Vātsyāyana’s Commentary, 52). 
 
Thus, we might succinctly say that the Nyāya view is that knowledge is a kind of successful cognition. Consider 
knowledge-by-perception (which will be the focus of this paper): what it is to know something via perception 
(pratyakṣa) is simply to have a perceptual experience of that thing. 
 
We might take an agent a’s perceptual experience of some object or property O to be constituted by the 
instantiation of some relation R between a and O. So, on the Nyāya pramāṇa theory, a mental event or cognition 
will count as knowledge when this relation is instantiated. In order for my occurrent mental state to count as a 
state in which I ‘know’ about the yellow banana in front of me, it suffices that I stand in the relation of perception 
to the banana and its yellowness. 
 
Analyzing knowledge in terms of cognitive success requires that we say something about what our cognitions 
are successful about and what their accuracy conditions are. For example: let us say that I have a total 
hallucination but that the scene I hallucinate is almost identical in appearance to my actual office, where I am 
sitting. I cannot, via introspection, distinguish between the hallucination and the real world. This hallucination 
might cause me to believe the true proposition that my desk is made of wood. But does the cognition I have of 
the hallucinated scene amount to knowledge? Obviously not: I am hallucinating. The Nyāya explanation is that 
this is not a case of actual perception (pratyakṣa) even though it seems to me that it is. In the case of total 
hallucination, you do not have any perceptual contact with the world: your occurrent cognition does not have 
objects in the world as cause and so cannot really be true of anything. 
 
While the reliabilist claims that the relation of perception justifies our taking beliefs to be knowledge, the Nyāya 
view takes the relation of perception to be the constitutive cause of our true cognitions. But we can see that both 
theories emphasize the success properties of perception. A reliabilist like Goldman would say that because 
perception is successful with respect to generating true beliefs, it has justificatory powers. Nyāya says something 
stronger but similar: perception is such that standing in a relation of perception to some object gives us 
knowledge of that object. Because knowledge is factive, this apparently entails the view that perception is fully 
reliable (i.e., that having a perception means having a ‘good’, non-illusory perception). 
 
2.2   Perception and Experience 
 
There is considerable debate about whether ‘perception’ ought to be treated as a success term which invariably 
relates perceivers to real-world contents. ‘Belief’ is not a success term: I can stand in the belief relation to p 
when p is not true. Can I stand in the relation of perception to an object O when O is not real? Or is something 
other than perception causing my phenomenal experience – the experience that I have as of the way the world is 
– when I have a hallucination of O? A subtler question: can the object of my perceptual experience be inaccurate 
in some sense? Can I have an experience of O as F when O is not F, or is my apparent experience of Fness in 
this case the mere seeming of experience; some sort of experience*?8 
 
For clarity, two distinctions might be made: 
 
1. Between accurate and inaccurate perception, 
2. Between veridical and non-veridical experience. 
 
The first distinction asks of hallucinations whether they are perceptions of some non-worldly object or whether 
they have some internal cause. The second distinction asks of the phenomenology of hallucination if it is 
indistinguishable from veridical experience (the same kind of thing as veridical experience) or if it just seems 
indistinguishable from veridical experience (a different kind of thing than veridical experience). Let us consider 
some ways of dividing things up. I will describe different theories of perception and experience and how they 
relate to one another, but – for ease of exposition – I will not attempt to explain motivations for (or against) these 
particular theories. 
 
I have been discussing perception in terms of a relation between perceiver and object. Now we might ask: is this 
a two-place relation (that is, a direct relation) or if it is in some sense mediated? The intuitive answer is that the 
relation of perception is a direct relation between agent and object; what I see when I look at a book is just that 
book. The objects out in the world make up the contents of my perception. Call this view direct realism. If direct 
realism seems trivial, perhaps it will be helpful to contrast it with two other theories of perception, both of which 
fall under the label subjectivism. 
 
The first of these subjective theories, dominant through most of the last century and prominently defended by 
A.J. Ayer (1956), G.E. Moore (1953), and Bertrand Russell (1912), is sense data theory. Sense data theorists 
hold that perception is not a direct relation between perceiver and object; instead, it is a relation between 
perceiver and a kind of subjective content, or sense data. Direct realism and sense data theory both explain 
perception in terms of a relation between perceiver and object. Another subjectivist theory, adverbialism, 
explains perception in terms of presentational aspects of experience. Perception of a red car is having an 
experience which presents itself to you car-ly and red-ly (Chisholm 1957). 
 
The focus of this paper is on direct realism. Direct realism is a theory of the relation of perception, but it is not 
itself a theory of perceptual experience. If I perceive a round red ball, then I have a relation to some object (a 
round red ball). But what explains the appearance of the ball as red and as round? We can distinguish two 
approaches to answering this question. On one approach, we first consider the possibility that there is some 
illusory feature of our experience. Perhaps the ball is not actually red, it is blue, but I am experiencing an illusion 
of redness. 
 
Wanting to tell the same story about the nature of experience of redness in the good case (the ball is actually red) 
and the illusory case (the ball is actually blue), we might adopt what is known as a common factor view. Let us 
say that perceptual experience is to be treated as a relation; common factor views of experience hold that 
perceptual experience consists in a uniform relation between good and bad cases. The most prominent common 
factor view in direct realism is common factor intentionalism, which takes the nature of experience to consist in 
a relation between perceiver and intentional (propositional) content. Intentionalism says having an experience 
of p is representing some content; in a veridical experience this representation is externally caused (by a direct 
perception of some object), in non-veridical experience it may have some external cause (illusion) and some 
internal cause, but it is the same representation of content. This representation is a common factor between good 
and bad cases. 
 
Another approach to the question of what explains experience is to analyze experience in terms of its success 
properties. We might think that in good cases, when you have an experience of p, it is because you see that p. 
That is, the experience is characterized entirely by the direct relation you have to the object of your perception. 
Call this naïve realism. 
 
 
 
If having an experience of p is just seeing that p, then what about the cases in which I have an illusory experience 
(cases where I seem to be having an experience that p but do not see p)? It may seem that the good and the bad 
experience are phenomenally indistinct, but in some constitutive way they are different. If I have an experience 
that q but do not see that q (because it is not there) there must be some other explanation. So, having an experience 
of p is either seeing that p or doing something else. Call this explanation of the relationship between good and 
illusory experience disjunctivism. 
 
Nyāya holds that there is a causal difference between a process that generates perception and a process that 
generates pseudo-perception. Specifically, non-veridical perceptions are caused by the revival of a reminiscent 
impression (samskara), which is discussed at length in NB. For example, in the case of an illusion of water (as 
in a mirage), the “immediate cause of this illusion is the recollection of water revived by the reminiscent 
impression of the previously perceived water” (ND) (Nyāya: Gautama’s Nyāya-Sutra with Vātsyāyana’s 
Commentary, 53). From the point of view of the perceiver, however, things appear to be the same in both cases. 
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 Let me note a subtle distinction often glossed over in discussions of naïve realism and disjunctivism. We have 
two theories of the intentionality of experience, intentionalism and naïve realism, and two theories of the overall 
nature of experience, disjunctivism and common factor theory. Naïve realism entails some sort of disjunctivism; 
a naïve realist account of good cases of perception cannot give a common factor treatment for cases in which no 
object is directly perceived. It is for this reason that ‘naïve realism’ is often used interchangeably with 
‘disjunctivism’. 
 
Intentionalists, however, are free to accept a sort of disjunctivism about the overall nature of experience. It is 
fine to say that experience in good cases is characterized by a representation of some content p and that in bad 
cases something else is going on. Though many motivations behind intentionalism come in the first place from 
the appeal of common factor views, intentionalism is compatible with disjunctivist treatments of the overall 
nature of experience. We might thus think that the following two characterizations are sufficient for our purposes 
here: 
 
Common Factor Intentionalism 
Having an experience of p is representing some intentional content. This experience can be externally 
caused (good cases) or internally caused (bad cases). 
 
Naïve Realism 
Perceptual experience in cases of veridical perception is fully exhausted by the relation of perception 
between perceiver and world. Having an experience of p is either seeing that p or doing something else. 
 
Intentionalist theories are currently dominant in the literature on theories of perceptual experience.9 Naïve 
realism (the view defended by Nyāya) is less popular, but gaining traction.10 
 
3   The Nyāya Argument 
 
I have now outlined the (externalist) Nyāya analysis of knowledge, which accounts for perception as a knowledge 
source in terms of its success properties. I have also given a rough overview of some (relevant) theories of 
perception and experience. In this section I will go over an argument coming from Nyāya (which I call the 
‘Nyāya argument’), from the school’s externalist theory of knowledge to a disjunctive theory of experience. In 
Section 4 I will attempt to apply some of these arguments to considerations about externalist theories of 
justification in general. 
 
As already noted, the Nyāya position is that perceptual knowledge involves a relation between perceiver and 
object; what Gangeśa calls “a veridical cognition” (GT) (Epistemology of Perception, 141). Nyāya claims that 
perceptual knowledge is a mental event caused constitutively by a relation’s instantiation between perceiver and 
object (or ‘part of the world’).11 Consider the following passages. First, from Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-Bhāṣya: 
 
Perception (pratyakṣa) is the function (vṛtti, i.e., vyāpāra) of each sense organ (akṣa, i.e., 
indriya) in respect of its appropriate object…When the function is of the nature of contact, the 
result is valid knowledge in the form of perception (NB) (Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya, 
Nyāya: Gautama’s Nyāya-Sutra with Vātsyāyana’s Commentary, 32). 
 
And this from Phaṇibūṣaṇa’s elucidation of the Nyāya-Sūtra: 
 
In his definition of perception Gautama… uses the expressions ‘invariably related to the object’ 
(avyabhicāri) i.e., non-erroneous and ‘of a definite character’ (vyavasāyātmaka) (ND) 
(Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya, Nyāya: Gautama’s Nyāya-Sutra with Vātsyāyana’s 
Commentary, 53). 
 
We can say that S knows that p if and only if she instantiates this relation with respect to p. Another way of 
putting this is to say that objects which a perceiver knows about are objects of her perception’s intentionality 
(objects at which her perception is directed). 
 
If having a perception is enough to guarantee knowledge, then perception has to be perfectly accurate. Otherwise, 
we would be committed to saying that a perception with a false intentionality (perception of a cup as silver when 
it is really tin) will count as knowledge simply because the right sort of relation is instantiated. There is a sense 
in which it is quite obvious that perception is not perfectly accurate. I may be hallucinating; what seem to me to 
be the contents of my perception may be other than how the world actually is. 
 
So, Nyāya argues, we must distinguish between good cases of perception (pratyakṣa) and bad cases. Gangeśa 
explains how treating knowledge as a cognitive relation leads to a kind of disjunctivism about perceptual 
experience: 
 
A veridical cognition is [not only known but] produced, too, from something extrinsic, not “of 
itself,” i.e., not from a collection of causes sufficient to pro- duce just any cognition. If a 
veridical cognition were produced from the same collection of causes as is sufficient to produce 
just any cognition, a non-veridical cognition would be a veridical cognition… Therefore, 
because of the difference between a veridical and a non-veridical cognition, the two are (in 
part) produced, respectively, by an epistemic excellence and an epistemic defeat (GT) (Phillips 
and Tatacharya, Epistemology of Perception, 141). 
 
Phaṇibūṣaṇa also notes this in his elucidation: 
 
Perception is… considered to be a pramāṇa and the very word pramāṇa signifies the 
instruments of valid knowledge alone. Thus the instruments of illusory perceptions are already 
excluded from perception as pramāṇa (ND) (Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya, Nyāya: 
Gautama’s Nyāya-Sutra with Vātsyāyana’s Commentary, 54). 
 
Pratyakṣa is a relation between perceiver and objects out in the world, causing a particular phenomenal 
experience. Whatever relational or non-relational state we think is instantiated in bad cases (illusion, 
hallucination) has an internal cause.12 Certain perceptions (good cases) have a particular intentionality: they are 
directed at objects in the world. Certain other pseudo-perceptions (bad cases) do not have the same intentionality 
or do not have an intentionality at all. Thus, we seem to have an argument from the Nyāya theory of knowledge 
– on which knowledge is a veridical cognition – to disjunctivism. As Phillips (2013) notes of the Nyāya view of 
true perception and illusory perception: “The two do not in fact have the same intentionality, and the one results 
from a veritable knowledge source (no mere method) and the other does not” (Epistemology in Classical India, 
p. 10). 
 
4   The Argument Revised 
 
The Nyāya argument, as I have presented it, is actually compatible with common factor intentionalism. The 
argument presents reasons for thinking that good cases of perception have some important epistemic differences 
from illusory cases. But a common factor intentionalist should be perfectly willing to agree to this: she agrees 
that ‘perception’ is a success term. The common factor intentionalist holds that perception is a relation between 
perceiver and object, and what is going on in bad cases is something else; both just happen to instantiate a 
phenomenal experience grounded in the same relation between perceiver and subjective intentional content. Both 
cause the same sort of experience, in other words. Let’s call this thesis, which allows that identical experiential 
states can have different epistemic merit, epistemic disjunctivism. 
 
We might ask the following: if knowledge is treated as a kind of true cognition, is it enough to say that the cause 
of perceptual experience is not identical in good and bad cases (epistemic disjunctivism)? Or do we also have to 
say, by way of experiential disjunctivism, that the experience itself is not identical in good and bad cases? I will 
argue that taking the Nyāya position on knowledge actually gives good reason to accept the view that perceptual 
experience is disjunctive. 
 
Common factor intentionalism (combined with Nyāya view of knowledge) holds that an experience of p is an 
intentional p state, which can be caused by a relation between perceiver and object (in which case they have 
knowledge) or internally caused (in which case they don’t). We might ask, however, whether the experience p 
itself plays an important epistemic role. If it can be shown that the experience itself causes a true cognition (an 
instance of knowing), then a view that takes veridical and illusory experiences to be constituted by the same 
relation will fail on the Nyāya account. In other words, if experience plays an important epistemological role, 
then Nyāya should rule out common factor intentionalism. Consider the following experience thesis. 
 
EX There is some knowledge for which perceptual experience is the only source. 
 
I will argue that knowledge of what certain things in the world are like meets this very criterion.13 
 
Let’s start with what can be explained by a common factor intentionalist who takes knowledge to be true 
cognition. She can explain how I might have knowledge of a red ball. A cognition of a red ball, in a good case, 
will be caused by an agent bearing a relation of perception to a red ball. Then we may say that this constitutes 
her knowledge of the red ball. In a bad case, she has not cognition of a red ball – just a false cognition internally 
caused. The common factor intentionalist says that the agent’s experience in the good and bad cases of redness 
and roundness is constituted by the same intentional state, but this need not give us pause, since experience plays 
no constitutive epistemic role here. 
 
We might think that experience plays a very different epistemic role, however, for certain other kinds of 
perceptual knowledge. Experience undoubtedly gives us knowledge of what things are like to us (experiencing 
red when I glimpse the red notebook on my desk lets me know what that phenomenology is like to me). We 
might also think that veridical experience gives us knowledge of what things are like in the world with respect 
to properties that those things have and that we experience. When I see a red ball, not only do I get (1) knowledge 
of a red object, or (2) knowledge of what redness is like to me, but also (3) knowledge of what an object with a 
certain property (redness) is like to look at. By experiencing a silver thing as silver, I learn what a thing that has 
the property of silver is like to look at. I learn something about what silver objects are really like. This knowledge 
comes directly from the experience. That is: whatever relation my experience of a silver thing as silver is 
(whether it is a relation to a proposition or to an object), it is a plausible candidate for perceptual knowledge. 
 
Is it uncontroversial that we have such perceptual knowledge? I think it must be. If I am looking at a red notebook 
on my desk, and I consider my current phenomenal state, I know through reflection that red objects are objects 
that produce this kind of experience. This is not something I have come to know a priori; I have learned what 
red objects are like through perceptual experience. If knowledge is a matter of factive relational mental 
states/events, then what I have learned could have resulted only from a knowledge event in which I experienced 
the redness of some red object or the silverness of some silver object. 
 
Why does this make trouble for common factor intentionalism? If I experience a tin thing as silver, I obviously 
do not learn anything about what silver things are like. This would require there to be some thing O such that O 
is silver and I learn what O is like with respect to its silverness. If I perceive a tin thing as silver, there is nothing 
that instantiates silverness, and so the claim that there is some silver thing, such that I have learned what it is 
like to experience that thing’s color, is false. Nor do I learn anything about what tin things are like. There is an 
object that instantiates tin-ness, and there are perhaps things that I learn about this object; however, I do not learn 
anything about what it is like with respect to its tin-ness. 
 
So, if I experience a tin thing as silver, I do not learn what silver things are like, though I may learn something 
about what it is like to have a certain kind of experience. But common factor intentionalism holds that the relation 
which constitutes my experience of silverness, when the object actually is silver, is the same relation as in the 
illusory experience of silverness. If this relation is to count as a knowledge state, then common factor 
intentionalism seems to be committed to my knowing what a silver thing is like by observing a tin thing. If 
instantiating p in one case gives me knowledge (knowledge of what silver things are like) then, on the kind of 
externalism under consideration here, instantiating p in every case will give me knowledge. Thus, if an 
experience of a cup as silver in one case gives me knowledge, then it will give me knowledge in every case 
where that experience is explained in terms of the same relation. 
 
The common factor intentionalist could say that what I come to have knowledge of in seeing a tin thing as silver 
is what it is like to see silver, or what the phenomenology of silvery experiences is. That may be. But the problem 
is that, in the good case, I get further knowledge of what that silver thing is like (of what it is like to observe the 
silver thing being observed). If there is a common factor between good and bad cases, then there is no way of 
discriminating the event in a good case from the event in a bad case. Either both cases would have to count as 
knowledge of what an (observed) silver thing is like, or else neither counts. 
 
Plainly, it does not help to say that what is actually constitutive of knowledge is the causal relation between the 
object and the perceiver. This would be to claim that the perceiver learns what tin things are like with respect to 
being tin by having an illusory experience of a tin thing as silver! So, if perceptual knowledge is just instantiating 
a relation between perceiver and content, and if a perceiver can know through experience what silver things are 
like, then veridical experience of a thing as silver must be a state different from nonveridical experience of a 
thing as silver, or the factivity of knowledge must be given up. 
 
If so-called epistemic disjunctivism can help, how it can help is not clear. At stake is whether instantiating 
particular relations can count as knowledge. If instantiating the relation of experience to an intentional content 
(out there in the world or propositional) can be knowledge, then a different relation will be needed to explain 
illusory cases. 
 
A disjunctivist account (one that is not just epistemic) encounters no such problem. Experiencing a cup as silver 
gives me knowledge of what silver things are like, in good cases, and is constituted by some relation aRs (a 
perceiver a bears the relation of experience R to a property of silverness s), which is constitutive of knowledge 
of what a silver thing is like with respect to its silverness. Experiencing a cup in the bad case is constituted by a 
different relation aVs* (a perceiver a bears the relation of non-veridical experience V to a property 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from silverness s*), providing an explanation of why it does not count as 
knowledge. 
 
Note the difference between this kind of argument and arguments (like those found in Byrne 2016 and Logue 
2012) to disjunctivism from claims about what we know. These arguments may support one another, but there 
is a difference in the details. Byrne’s and Logue’s projects rely on intuitions about what we know; my argument 
looks to considerations about how we know. 
 
To focus on Logue’s argument: she proposes that intuitions about what we know via experience (about color 
and shape properties) suggest naïve realism. We take it as intuitive that knowing things about the way shapes 
and colors are comes from experiences of shapes and colors. Logue uses this insight to locate a significant 
epistemic difference between good and bad cases of experience (without appealing to any particular analysis of 
knowledge). A problem with Logue’s argument is examined by Pautz (forthcoming), who notes that the ability 
of our experience to track facts about the world should not be counted on. 
 
I have proposed that an argument can be mounted from the analysis of knowledge itself – an argument which 
should give us pause about common factor intentionalism. Given an analysis of knowledge that reduces it to 
certain states, the fact that common factor views do not discriminate between veridical and illusory states with 
some content p means either giving up the factivity of knowledge, giving up this analysis of knowledge, or 
giving up common factor intentionalism, as in this trilemma: 
 
K Knowledge is the instantiation of a relation aRp. 
CF Veridical and nonveridical experience aRp instantiating. 
F Knowledge is factive. 
 
The Nyāya response is to give up CF. If knowledge is just the instantiation of certain relations, there might be 
non-factive relations that are phenomenologically indistinguishable from factive relations. 
 
4.1   Disjunctivist intentionalism or naïve realism? 
 It might be tempting to take any good argument for disjunctivism to be a good argument for naïve realism and 
against intentionalism. But perhaps this is not always so: accepting a form of disjunctivist intentionalism might 
be the best solution to the above trilemma. A disjunctivist version of intentionalism holds that in good cases 
experience is representational (as opposed to naïve/direct) and in bad cases also representational, though in a 
different way, perhaps via a different mechanism of representation. There are reasons why this is the theory of 
experience most appropriate for Nyāya. 
 
The theory solves a generality problem for the kind of externalism about knowledge that Nyāya defends.  If 
perception is constituted entirely by a relation between perceiver and object, and if knowledge states are caused 
directly by instantiating this relation, we should be able to claim that perceivers have knowledge of all sorts of 
microphysical facts (about cells, molecules and other items that make up the objects of our perception) as well 
as facts of which we have knowledge intuitively. But intentionalism solves the generality problem that makes it 
impossible to say why I have knowledge of the tin cup’s physical but not its microphysical features. We can say 
that knowledge supervenes on the represented content, and that this content is far more coarse-grained than the 
totality of facts before us in any given instance of perception. So the relation between perceiver and object which 
is constitutive of knowledge is really a relation between perceiver and representation caused by a direct relation 
between perceiver and object. 
 
5   Conclusion 
 
To summarize: 
 
i. I reconstructed an argument from the Nyāya account of knowledge to a disjunctivist theory of perceptual 
experience. 
ii. I noted that the simplest version of the argument entails only what I have called ‘epistemic 
disjunctivism’: the view that veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences can be constituted by 
the same relation but still have different epistemological properties. 
iii. I then proposed using the Nyāya position to argue for a stronger version of disjunctivism: that veridical 
and non-veridical experiences cannot be constituted by the same relation. 
a. This argument is based on out having knowledge of what things are like; knowledge that comes 
directly from experience. 
 
What to make of all this? There are good arguments for and against intentionalism and naïve realism, not to 
speak of externalism in epistemology. But is this the kind of argument to make? Consider the trilemma again: 
 
K Knowledge is the instantiation of a relation aRp. 
CF Veridical and nonveridical experience aRp instantiating. 
F Knowledge is factive. 
 
F must not be given up, plainly. But what about K and CF? Or, to ask a metaphilosophical question: if we start 
with K assumed or being argued for, is it appropriate to conclude by rejecting CF, or is it K that must be rejected? 
I have no answer. But I think there is a general lesson: philosophers should attend more to these second-order 
implications of analyses of knowledge and justification. 
 
University of Texas at Austin 
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1 I owe a large debt of gratitude to Stephen Phillips, who encouraged me to pursue this project, and offered crucial 
feedback on an early draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to Ian Proops, and to three anonymous referees for this 
journal, for invaluable comments on later versions of this paper. Thanks to Sinan Dogramaci, Jon Brink Morgan, 
and to the participants in a seminar on Classical Indian epistemology at the University of Texas at Austin in the Fall 
of 2016, for discussing these ideas with me at length. 
2 There is a disagreement about the composition of the Nyāya-Sūtra. It is usually attributed to Gautama Aksapada, 
who may have lived sometime between the sixth century BCE and the second century CE; other authors may have 
contributed, or the original text may have been composed collectively. It was edited in either the first or the second 
century CE (Ganeri 2001, 10). 
3 Pramāṇa is also translated as “methods of knowing” (Ganeri 2001, 10); the “cause of veridical cognition” (Dasti 
2008, 283). 
4 The principle primary sources referenced in this paper are the first chapter of the Nyāya-Sūtra (I will use the 
abbreviation NS), Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-Bhāṣya (NB), which is a commentary on NS, Phaṇibūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa’s 
Nyāyadarśana (ND), which is a fourteenth century commentary on NS and NB (I borrow these abbreviations from 
Dasti 2008); the perception chapter of Gaṅgeśa’s Tattva-cintā-maṇi (GT), and Udayana’s Ātmatattvaviveka (UA). 
UA is an attempted reconciliation between Nyāya and Buddhist traditions, and kick-started the Navya- Nyāya 
school in the thirteenth century. Quotations of primary source material will be taken from translations by 
Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya (1982), for NS, NB, and ND, Phillips and Tatacharya (2004), for GT, and 
Kher and Kumar (1987), for UA. See Phillips, Epistemology in Classical India, 2013 for a recent survey of this 
material. 
5 See (Schoenfield forthcoming) for a recent attempt to divorce internalism from luminosity. 
6 In fact, the Nyāya view is sometimes described as a kind of ‘process reliabilism’ (Patil 2009, 34). 
7 Specifically, the object ‘rightly known’ (prameya). 
8 It is worth noting that the Nyāya story here is that in illusory perception there is something you get right about the 
contents of your experience: namely, that there is an object about which you have a mistaken impression. 
9 Intentionalism in one form or another has been defended very recently by Alex Byrne (2016), Adam Pautz 
(forthcoming), and Michael Tye (2009), among others. 
10 Naïve realism has recently been defended by John Campbell (2002) and Heather Logue (2012), among others. 
11 This is analogous with contemporary ‘dogmatist’ positions in the epistemology of perception (Miller 2016). 
12 There are also cases of pseudo-knowledge sources (pramāṇa-ābhāsa). 
13 This thesis is commonly discussed in the literature on phenomenal concepts, which are putative concepts that can 
only be possessed by undergoing certain perceptual experiences. While phenomenal concepts do present a fairly 
clear example of the experience thesis, there are some fairly compelling arguments against the existence of 
phenomenal concepts (Ball 2009). Thus, I do not wish to rely on them in making my claim. 
                                                     
